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Do Precautionary Motives Explain China’s High Saving Rate?

The notebook Nondurables-During-Great-Recession shows that the collapse in consumer spending in the U.S. during the Great Recession could easily have been caused by a moderate and plausible increase in the degree of uncertainty.

But that exercise might make you worry that invoking difficult-to-measure “uncertainty” can explain anything (e.g. “the stock market fell today because the risk aversion of the representative agent increased”).

The next exercise is designed to show that there are limits to the phenomena that can be explained by invoking plausible changes in uncertainty.

The specific question is whether a high degree of uncertainty can explain China’s very high saving rate (approximately 25 percent), as some papers have proposed. Specifically, we ask “what beliefs about uncertainty would Chinese consumers need to hold in order to generate a saving rate of 25 percent, given the rapid pace of Chinese growth?”

The Thought Experiment

In more detail, our consumers will initially live in a stationary, low-growth environment (intended to approximate China before 1978). Then, unexpectedly, income growth will surge at the same time that income uncertainty increases (intended to approximate the effect of economic reforms in China since 1978.) Consumers believe the high-growth, high-uncertainty state is highly persistent, but that ultimately growth will slow to a “normal” pace matching that of other advanced countries.

The Baseline Model

We want the model to have these elements:

  1. “Standard” infinite horizon consumption/savings model, with mortality and permanent and temporary shocks to income

  2. The capacity to provide a reasonable match to the distribution of wealth inequality in advanced economies

  3. Ex-ante heterogeneity in consumers’ discount factors (to capture wealth inequality)

All of these are features of the model in the paper “The Distribution of Wealth and the Marginal Propensity to Consume” by Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka, and White (2017), for which all of the computational results were produced using the HARK toolkit. The results for that paper are available in the 𝚌𝚜𝚝𝚠𝙼𝙿𝙲 directory.

But With A Different ConsumerType

One feature that was not present in that model is important here:

  • A Markov state that represents the state of the Chinese economy (to be detailed later)

HARK’s 𝙼𝚊𝚛𝚔𝚘𝚟𝙲𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚞𝚖𝚎𝚛𝚃𝚢𝚙𝚎 is the right tool for this experiment. So we need to prepare the parameters to create that ConsumerType, and then create it.

Set Up the Growth Process

For a Markov model, we need a Markov transition process. Here, we create that array. Remember, for this simple example, we just have a low-growth state and a high-growth state. The default constructor for MrkvArray is already a two-state process, so we just need to set the probability of remaining in the high growth state and the probability of remaining in the stagnant state (once there).

Other parameters that are not used during initialization can also be assigned here, by changing the appropriate value in the 𝚒𝚗𝚒𝚝_𝙲𝚑𝚒𝚗𝚊_𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚜_𝚍𝚒𝚌𝚝𝚒𝚘𝚗𝚊𝚛𝚢; however, they can also be changed later, by altering the appropriate attribute of the initialized 𝙼𝚊𝚛𝚔𝚘𝚟𝙲𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚞𝚖𝚎𝚛𝚃𝚢𝚙𝚎.

Import and initialize the Agents

Here, we bring in an agent making a consumption/savings decision every period, subject to transitory and permanent income shocks, AND a Markov shock

Now, add in ex-ante heterogeneity in consumers’ discount factors.

The cstwMPC parameters do not define a single discount factor; instead, there is ex-ante heterogeneity in the discount factor. To prepare to create this ex-ante heterogeneity, first create the desired number of consumer types:

Now, generate the desired ex-ante heterogeneity, by giving the different consumer types each their own discount factor.

First, decide the discount factors to assign:

Setting Up the Experiment

The experiment is performed by a function we will now write.

Recall that all parameters have been assigned appropriately, except for the income process.

This is because we want to see how much uncertainty needs to accompany the high-growth state to generate the desired high savings rate.

Therefore, among other things, this function will have to initialize and assign the appropriate income process.

Now we can use the function we just defined to calculate the path of the national saving rate following the economic reforms, for a given value of the increase to the variance of permanent income accompanying the reforms. We are going to graph this path for various values for this increase.

Remember, we want to see if a plausible value for this increase in uncertainty can explain the high Chinese saving rate.

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We’ve calculated the path of the national saving rate as we wanted. All that’s left is to graph the results!

<Figure size 640x480 with 1 Axes>

The figure shows that, if the rate of growth increases the way Chinese growth did, but is not accompanied by any change in the degree of uncertainty, the model’s predicted saving rate declines drastically, from an initial (calibrated) value of about 0.1 (ten percent) to close to zero. For this model to have any hope of predicting an increase in the saving rate, it is clear that the increase in uncertainty that accompanies the increase in growth will have to be substantial.

The red line shows that a mere doubling of uncertainty from its baseline value is not enough: The steady state saving rate is still below its slow-growth value.

When we assume that the degree of uncertainty quadruples, the model does finally predict that the new steady-state saving rate will be higher than before, but not much higher, and not remotely approaching 25 percent.

Only when the degree of uncertainty increases by a factor of 8 is the model capable of producing a new equilbrium saving rate in the ballpark of the Chinese value.

But this is getting close to a point where the model starts to break down (for both numerical and conceptual reasons), as shown by the erratic path of the saving rate when we multiply the initial variance by 11.

We do not have historical data on the magnitude of permanent income shocks in China in the pre-1978 period; it would be remarkable if the degree of uncertainty increased by such a large amount, but in the absence of good data it is hard to know for sure.

What the experiment does demonstrate, though, is that it is not the case that “it is easy to explain anything by invoking some plausible but unmeasurable change in uncertainty.” Substantial differences in the degree of permanent (or highly persistent) income uncertainty across countries, across periods, and across people have been measured in the literature, and those differences could in principle be compared to differences in saving rates to get a firmer fix on the quantitative importance of the “precautionary saving” explanation in the Chinese context.